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ENDNOTES: A PATTERN OF R ULING A GA INST M OTHER N ATU RE: WILDLI FE SPEC IES CASES D EC ID ED BY J USTICE 
KAVANAUGH 0 THE DC CIRCUIT 
continued from p age 10 
16 See Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 703-7 12 [hereinafter MBTA] 
(making it unlaw ful to take, kill , or possess migratory birds); see also 50 C.F. R. 
§ J 0. 13 (201 6) ( li sting the protected birds under the Migratory Bird Treaty Act 
and treaties). 
17 See Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act, 16 
U.S.C. §§ 1801 - 189 1 (acting to conserve and manage fi shery resources found 
off the coasts of the United States) . 
18 See generally ational Environmemal Po licy Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 432 1-4370 
[here ina fter NEPA] (enriching the understanding of the importance of natural 
resources and ecological systems to citizens). 
19 See, e.g., ational Park Organic Act, 54 U.S.C. § 100101 (201 2); National 
Forest M anagement Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1687 (201 2); Federal Land Man-
agement and Po licy Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 170 1- 1787(201 2); National Wildlife 
Refuge Syste m Act, J 6 U.S.C. §§ 668dd-668ee (201 2). 
20 See Joseph Toma in , Kavanaug h 's Political Leanings Likely Will Be Wrillen 
in fo Law, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER (August 6, 201 8), https: //www.cincinnati .com! 
story/opinion/20 18/08/06/opinion-kavanaughs-politica l-leanings- likely-writ-
len- into- law/862653002/ (stating that environmental cases o ften "pit corporate 
inte rests against the public interest for a clean and hea lthy environment. Here, 
Kavanaugh ' s ' hands-off approach to policy is jettisoned. ln his opini ons, 
Kavanaugh is unafraid to strain the interpreta tion of statutes, engage the judi-
c iary in po licymaking, and, on occasion, give mini-lectures on constitutional 
law and government. Hi s enviro nmental law opinions, then, directly involve 
po licy and po litics. In other words, Kavanaugh is una fraid to make, not fo llow, 
the law"). 
21 See, e.g. , U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency v. EM E Homer City Generation, 572 
U.S. 489, 524 (20 14) (overturning Justice Kavanaugh 's decision 6-2 in a case 
where Justice Kavanaugh holds the E PA to an illegally high standard of review, 
with human lives and health on the line); Mex ichem Fluor, Inc. v. U.S. Envtl. 
Prot. Agency, 866 F.3d 45 1, 453 -54, 464 (D.C. Cir. 20 17) (stating Justice 
Kavanaugh, over a powerfu l dissent, created a new reading of Section 6 12 of 
the C lean A ir Act that allows fo reign manu facturers of ozone-depleting and 
c limate change- inducing hydrofluorocarbons to avoid regulation; thi s decision, 
too, has been appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court on a writ of certiorari). 
22 According to an August 20 18 Public Citizen study, Justice Kavanaugh 
ruled in favo r of Big Business - defined as the Chamber of Commerce, National 
Assoc iation of M anufacturers, and American Petro leum Institute - in twenty-
five (25) of the thirty-three (33) cases in this category, fo r a seventy-six percent 
favorab le bias ra te. Judge Brell Kavanaugh 's Decisions in Cases with Leading 
Business Association Involvement, CHAMBER WATCH (Aug. 30, 20 18), https:// 
www .chambero fcommercewatch .org/j udge-ka vanaugh-business-dec is ions/. 
23 Id. 
24 o . 17-7 J, sli p op. I (U.S. Nov. 27, 20 18). 
25 
.Id. at 15. 
26 Id. 
27 See, e.g. , Massachusetts v. U.S. En vtl. Prot. Agency, 549 U.S. 497, 534-35 
(2007) (forci ng the EPA to take action under the Clean Air Act aga inst global 
warming and c limate change); Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 7 15, 733-37 
(2006) (emphas iz ing that regulation of wetlands fall s under the Clean Water 
Act); Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Oregon, 5 15 U.S. 
687, 703-08 ( 1995) (upholding the inclusion of "habitat harm" as definiti on of 
" take" under the ESA). 
28 See Carpenter Indus. Council v . Z inke, 854 F.3d I, 9 (D. C. Cir. 20 17); Otay 
Mesa Prop., L.P. v. U.S. Dep' t o fthe Interi or, 646 F.3 d 9 14, 91 8- 19 (D.C. Cir. 
20 I I); Am. Bird Conservancy v. Fed. Comm . Comm ' n, 5 16 F .3d 1027, I 03 5-
37 (D.C. Cir. 2008). 
29 Am. B ird Conservancy, Inc., 5 16 F.3d at I 035-37 . 
30 Id. at J 03 1 n. I (explaining that Justice Kavanaugh was incorrect in assert-
ing that the petitioner 's case was not ripe because the FCC was not, in fact, 
reconsidering it s order regarding migratory birds and communication towers in 
the Gulf Coast region). 
31 854 F .3d at I . 
32 Id. at 5 ("A do llar of economic harm is still an inju ry-in-fact fo r standing 
purposes."). 
33 Id. 
34 646 F.3d 9 14 (D.C. Cir. 20 11 ). 
24 
35 I d. at 9 18 (finding that, absent further explanation, a SLLrvey of the plain-
ti ffs ' property which fo und an endangered species in one location was not 
enough to demonstrate that the plainti ffs ' property was occupied by that species 
fo r the purposes of the ESA). 
36 829 F.3d 710 (D.C. Cir. 201 6). 
37 Id. at 732 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (emphas is in original) (contending 
that the "EPA considered the benefits to animals of revoking the permit, but 
[the] EPA never considered the costs to humans"). 
38 Order No. 15-1 363 (D.C. Cir. 201 8) (concerning the Clean Power Plan). 
39 Id. 
40 472 F. 3d 872 (D.C. Ci r. 2006). 
41 Id. at 879-82 (Kavanaugh, J ., concurring). 
42 Justice Kavanaugh's 96-4 "against wildlife" total score is notable because 
other judges on the D.C. Circuit scored much better than Justice Kavanaugh ' s. 
Judge David Sentelle, fo r example, undoubtedly a conservati ve jurist, appointed 
by Pres ident Reagan to fill Justi ce Scalia 's seat on the D.C. Circuit, possesses 
a 57-43 "aga inst wildlife" score. Judge Merrick Ga rl and, Pres ident Obama's 
pick to replace Justice Sca lia on the Supreme Court, but who never received a 
vote by the maj ority Senate Republicans, possesses a 46-54 "against wildlife" 
score, meaning he votes with wildlife fifty-four percent of the time. See infra 
Appendix A and B. 
43 Fund fo r Animals v. Kempthorne, 472 F.3d 872, 873 (D.C. Cir. 2006) 
(holding that " [t]he amended Migratory Bird Treaty Act does not ban the hunt-
ing or killing of non-nati ve migratory bird species, including mute swans"). 
44 Id. at 873, 879. 
45 See generally Convention fo r the Protection of Migratory Birds, U.S. -
Great Bri ta in, Aug. 16, 19 16, 39 Stat. 1702; Convention Between the United 
States of America and the Uni ted Mexican States fo r the Protection o f Migra-
tory Birds, Etc., February 7, 1963 , 50 Stat. 131 1; The Convention Between the 
Government of the United States of America and the Government of Japan for 
the Protection of Migratory Birds in Danger of Ex tinction, and Their Environ-
ment, Mar. 4, 1972, 25 U.S.T. 3329; Convention Between the United States of 
Ameri ca and the Union of Soviet Sociali st Republics Concerning the Conserva-
tion of Migratory Birds and Their Environment, Nov. 19, 1976, 29 U.S .T. 4647. 
46 Fund for Animals Inc., 4 72 F .3d at 88 1-82. 
47 See, e.g., 19 11 Treaty fo r the Preservation and Protection of Fur Seals, July 
7, 19 11 , 37 Stat. 154; 1942 Western Hemisphere Convention on Nature Protec-
tion and Wildli fe Preservation, May I, 1942, 56 Stat. 1374; 161 U.N.T.S 193 ; 
1975 Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna 
and Flora; Mar. 3, 1973, 12 l.L.M I 085 ; 1976 Agreement on Conservation of 
Polar Bears, Nov. 15, 1973, 13 l.L.M 13. 
48 Despite vo luminous U.S. Supreme Court precedent upholding the law-
making force of treati es pursuant to U.S. Const. Art. 11 , § 2, Justice Kavana-
ugh's unnecessary "extra" concurrence also oddly laments treat ies ' ability "to 
eliminate the House of Representati ves from the law-making process ." Fund 
for Animals , 472 F.3d at 88 1 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring); see also Darren 
Samuelsohn, Kavanaugh 's Words on Presidenlial Probes Come Back to Haunt 
H im , PouT1co (July I 0, 20 18), https://www.po litico.com/story/20 18/07/1 0/ 
brett-kavanaugh-pres idential-investigations-708705. 
49 Fund fo r Animals, 472 F.3d at 875-76. 
50 i d. at 873 (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 703(a) (201 2)). 
51 Migratory Bird Treaty Reform Act of2004, 16 .S.C. § 703 (a){ l) (20 12). 
52 Fund for Animals, 472 F.3d at 876-77 . 
53 Id. at 873, 879. 
54 Oceana, Inc. v. Gutierrez, 488 F.3d 1020, 102 1, 1025 (D.C. Cir. 2007). 
55 Id. at I 02 1-22, I 025-26. 
56 Id. at I 025-26. 
57 See id. at I 02 1-22, I 025-26. 
58 See Am. Bird Conservancy v. Fed. Comm. Comm ' n, 5 16 F.3d I 027, I 034-
35 (D.C. Cir. 2008). 
59 Id. at I 035. 
60 i d. at I 03 I. 
61 Id. 
62 North Carolina Fisheries Ass ' n v. Gutierrez, 550 F.3d 16, 17 (D.C. Cir. 
2008). 
63 Id. at 19. 
64 Id. at 2 1. 
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65 E. iagara Pub. Power All. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 558 F.3d 
564, 566 (D.C. Cir. 2009). 
66 Id. 
67 Id.; see also 16 U.S.C. § 808(a)(2)(D) (20 12). 
68 £ . Niagara Pub. Power All., 558 F.3d at 567. 
69 Id. at 567-68. 
7° For full disclosure, the author represented and argued for the Defendant-
Intervenor, which was on the losing side of the case. 
7 1 Otay Mesa Prop. v. U.S. Dep' t of Interi or, 646 F.3d 9 14, 9 16-1 9 (D.C. C ir. 
2011) [hereinafler Oray Mesa If] . 
72 Otay Mesa Prop. v. U.S. Dep ' t of Interior, 7 14 F. Supp. 2d 73, 83 (D.D.C. 
20 I 0) [hereinafler Oray Mesa J] . 
73 Oray Mesa II, 646 F .3d at 9 16-1 7. 
74 Id. at 9 18- 19. 
75 id. at 9 19. 
76 S ierra C lub v. Van Antwerp, 66 1 F.3d 1147, 1149-50 (D.C. Ci r. 20 12) 
[hereinafler Sierra Club If] . 
77 Id.; see also Sierra C lu b v. Van Antwerp, 7 19 F. Supp. 2d 58, 76 (D.D.C. 
20 I 0) [hereinafler Sierra Club!]. 
78 Sierra Club I, 7 19 F. Supp. 2d at 6 1. 
79 Sierra Club II, 66 1 F.3d at I 156. 
80 Id. at 1157. 
8 1 See 16 U.S .C. § I 538(a)(2) (20 12); see also Sierra Club II, 66 1 F.3d at 
11 56. 
82 Just ice Kavanaugh did not order ESA Section 7 consultation in this case 
despite the clear federal sc ientifi c evidence that the snake would be harmed. 
On other environmental cases where it has been alleged Justice Kavanaugh was 
" pro-environment," these very small handful of decisions are eas ily explainable 
on other grounds. See, e.g. , Nat' l Mining Assoc. v. McCarthy, 758 F.3d 243 
(D.C. Cir. 20 14) (ho lding that the Clean Water Act did not prohibit interagency 
coordinat ion and that an EPA guidance on state-issued water pollution permits 
was not subject to judicia l review); Nat. Res. Def. Counci l v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. 
Agency, 749 F. 3d 1055 (D.C. Cir. 20 14) (deny ing the Natural Resources 
Defense Counc il 's petition on cement pollution except w ith regard to clearly 
suspect the EPA affirmati ve defense policy in the Agency ru le); Am. Trucking 
Ass' ns v. Envt . Prot. Agency, 600 F.3d 624 (D.C. C ir. 20 I 0) (upho lding stricter 
California motor vehicle standards). Assu ming these flimsy "defenses of the 
environment" represent " two total wins," even a broken c lock is co rrect twice 
per day. 
83 Friends of Blackwater v. Sa lazar, 69 1 F.3d 428, 439-40 (D.C. C ir. 20 12). 
4 Id. at 438 (arguing the impracticability of the Secretary adopt ing criteria 
that "by their nature could never be met and hence would precl ude delisting a 
spec ies so long as those criteria remain in effect"). 
85 Id. at 440. 
86 16 U.S.C. § 1535(1) (20 12) (stat ing that state laws may be more, but not 
less, restrictive than the regulations in the ESA). 
87 Conservation Force v. Jewell , 733 F.3d 1200, 1202, 1207 (D.C. Cir. 2013). 
88 Id. at 1207. 
89 Id. at 1203-05. 
90 Center for Biolog ica l Diversity v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 749 F.3d I 079, 
1080 (D.C. C ir. 20 14); see generally Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C.S. § 7409(b)(2) 
(describing national secondary ambient air quality standards which specify "a 
leve l of air qua lity the atta inment and maintenance of which ... is requisite 
to protect the public we! fare from any known or anti cipated adverse effects 
associated with the presence of such air pollutant in the ambient air"). 
9 1 See generally Cenrer for Biological Diversity, 749 F.3d at I 080-82. 
92 Id. at I 085 (quoting the Final Rule, 77 Fed. Reg. I 021 8, 20,236 (Apr. 3, 
20 12), to explai n that direct exposure is not the only way in which chemicals 
can cause harm). 
93 Id. at I 089 (quoting the rule and explaining that the EPA "determined that a 
rev ision was not 'appropriate ' when sc ientific uncertainty dep rived the Agency 
of a ' reasoned way to choose ' an appropriate standard"). 
94 Id. at 1090 n.1 8. 
95 Id. at 903. 
96 Id. at 90 I . 
97 id.; see also 16 U.S.C. § 1533 (a)( I) (20 12) (stat ing that determinations are 
conc lusions that a spec ies is or is not endangered or threatened); 16 U.S.C. § 
1533 (b)(3)-(4) (20 12) (outlining the statu tory time frames by which FWS or 
NMFS must respond to petitions to li st or deli st) 
98 Friends of Animals v. Ashe, 808 F.3d 900, 90 1 ( D.C. Cir. 20 15). 
99 i d. at 903. 
Fall 2018 
too Id. at 900-0 I. 
IOI Id. at 904-05 . 
102 See 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(3)(B) (20 12) . 
103 Defs. of Wildlife v. Jewell , 8 15 F.3d I , 3, 5 (D.C. C ir. 20 16). 
104 Id. at 3, 7, 8. 
105 id. at 7. 
t06 Id. 
107 Id. at 3, 6-7. 
108 Ark Initiati ve v. Tidwell , 8 16 F.3d I 19, 12 1, 122 (D.C. C ir. 201 6); see 36 
C.F.R. § 294.41 (defining road less area characteristics as " ( I) high qua li ty or 
undisturbed soi l, water, and air; (2) sources of public drinking water; (3) dive r-
sity o f plant and anima l communities; (4) Habitat for threa tened, endangered, 
proposed, candidate, and sensi ti ve species, and for those spec ies dependent o n 
large, undi stu rbed areas of land ; (5) primitive, semi-primitive non motori zed 
and semi-primiti ve motorized c lasses of di spersed recreation; (6) reference 
landscapes; (7) natural-appea ring landsca pes w ith high scenic qua lity; (8) 
trad iti ona l cultural properties and sacred s ites; and (9) other loca ll y identified 
unique characteristics"). 
!09 See Ark Initiative, 816 F.3d at 122, 128. 
110 id. at 122. 
111 See Friends of Animals v . Salazar, 626 F. Supp. 2d I 02, I 05-06 (D.D.C. 
2009). 
112 See 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(l)(A). 
11 3 See Salazar, 626 F. Supp. 2d at I 07 (stati ng the cause of action and dis-
cussing the import take permit exemption to the ESA that al lows for the trade 
of hunted trophies of an endange red capti ve-bred animal). 
114 See Friends of Animals v. Jewe ll , 824 F.3d I 033, I 036-37 (D.C. C ir. 20 16). 
115 Id. at I 037 . 
116 See Earthreports, Inc. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm ' n, 828 F.3d 949, 
952 ( D.C. Cir. 20 16). 
117 Id. at 952 . 
11 8 Id. at 959. 
119 See generally id. 
120 Mingo Logan Coal Co. v. U.S. Envt l. Prot. Agency, 829 F.3d 7 10, 730-41 
(D.C. C ir. 20 16) (Kavanaugh, J., dissent ing). 
121 Id. at 7 17, 730; see also C lean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 125 1- 1388. The 
C lean Water Act's wet lands provisions, under Section 404 of the Act, have 
proven to be a li ghtning rod fo r conservative lega l activists, including Justice 
Kavanaugh, over the years. 
122 See generally Mingo Logan Coal Co., 829 F.3d at 732, 737-38 (Kava-
naugh, J., dissenting) (construing a cost-benefit ana lys is to the EPA ' s permit 
decision making under Section 404 of the C lean Water Act). 
123 See id. 
124 Id. at 722, 723-24 n .7. 
125 See id. 
126 Carpenters Indus. Counc il v. Z inke, 854 F.3 d I, 2 (D.C . C ir. 20 17). 




13 1 Id. at 2-3. 
132 id. at 9. 
133 See generally Clean Ai r Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 740 I-767 1 (20 12). 
134 Coral Davenport, Appeals Court Hears Challenges ro Obama 's Cli-
mate Change Rule, .Y. TIMES (Sept. 27, 2016), https://www .nytimes. 
com/20 16/09/28/us/po I itics/a ppeals-court-hears-cha 1 lenge-to-obamas-c l i mate-
change-ru les. htrn I. 
135 42 U.S.C. § 7602(h). 
136 549 U.S. 497 (2007). 
137 See id. at 534 . 
138 See, e.g., Emi ly ' s List v. Fed. Election Comm ' n, 581 F.3d I , 4 (D.C. Cir. 
2009) ("The First Amendment, as interpreted by the Supreme Court, protects 
the ri ght of individual c itizens to spend unlimited amo unts to express the ir 
views about policy issues and candidates fo r public office."). 
!39 See, e.g., 42 U.S .C. § 752 1(a)( l )-(3) (20 12) (ob ligating the Agency ' s to 
make endangerment findings in specific c ircumstances). 
140 See generally Donald J. Wuebbles, Dav id W. Fahey, & Kathy A. Hibbard, 
Climate Science Special Report: Fourth National Climate Assessment, U.S. 
GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE RESEARCH PROGRAM (20 17) (ana lyzing how human-
caused c limate pollution has led to a number of negati ve impacts inc luding 
wi ldl ife and habitat declines). 
25 
141 See generally Robert We issman, An analysis of Justice Ka vanaugh 's Opin-
ions in Split-Decision Cases, Pusuc CmzEN (2018) (finding an "overwhelming 
tendency to reach conclusions favorable to business interests and opposed to 
consume rs, wo rkers, e nvironmenta l protectio ns, and v ictims of human ri ghts 
a buses" ). 
142 The .S . Constitution places no upper o r lo we r limit on the number of 
Supre me Court justices . The number does not need to be nine. In the sho rt 
term, the Senate should not be " rushed" in confirming an ideologica l jurist 
who would tip the balance of the Court, particula rly with mid-term elections 
coming up, as well as the ongo ing criminal investi gation of the President 
and hi s a ides. See, e.g., B o bby Cervantes, Ted Cruz Says 'Long Historical 
Precedenl ' for Smaller Supreme Court, POLITI FACT (No v. 23 , 201 6), https:// 
w w w . po I iti fact.co m/texas/staternen ts/2016/nov /23/ted-cruz/ted-cruz-says-long-
h istorical-preceden t-smaller-su/ (explaining that throughout the hi story of the 
Supreme C ourt, there have been large gaps of time with only eight justices, 
several times lasting over one year) ; ick Fahey, The Supreme Court Can Deal 
wilh Eighl Justices, C B C (Mar. 3, 201 6), https://www.cnbc.com/20 16/03/03/ 
the-supreme-co urt-can-dea l-with-eight-justices.html (noting that nearl y twenty 
pe rce nt o f a ll Supreme Court opinio ns since 1946 have been ti e votes) . 
143 See, e.g., Igor Bobic, Democratic Senator says Brett Kavanaugh 
confirmation process is "Not Normal, " H LJFFINGTON PosT (Sept. 2, 201 8), 
https ://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/brett-kavanaugh-documents_ 
us_ 5b8c0a28e4b0ct7b003 73cf9; John Bowden, Feinstein 'Alarmed ' National 
Archives is Withholding Kavanaugh Documents, T HE HI LL (Aug. 8, 201 8), 
http ://thehill .com/homenews/senate/400860-feinste in -a larmed-nationa l-
arc hi ves-is-withholding-kavanaugh-documentshttp://thehill .com/ho me news/ 
senate/400860- fei nstein-a !armed-national-arch i ves-is-withholding-ka vanaugh-
documen ts; Shery l Stolberg, While House Withholds 100,000 pages of Judge 
Brett Kavanaugh 's Records, N.Y. T1MES (Sept. I , 201 8) , https: //www .nytimes. 
com/201 8/09/0 I / us/politics/kavanaugh-records.html ). 
144 Jordain Carney, Republicans Confirming Trump's Court Nominees 
at Record Pace, T HE HI LL (M ay I , 201 8), https://thehill.com/homenews/ 
senate/385 728-repu bl icans-con firmin g-trumps-court-nominees-at-record-pace . 
145 Cf " And I brought you into a plentiful country, to eat the fruit the reo f and 
the goodness thereo f: but when ye entered, ye defil ed my land, and made mine 
heri tage an abo mination." Jeremiah 2:7 ( King James). 
E N DNOT ES: REA L PRO PER T Y S U B LESSO RS E SCA PE C E RC LA OWNER LI A BILI TY IN TH E S ECOND CIRCU IT 
continued f rom page 21 
See id. (adding that a n e mployee o f the sublessee later burned the site to the 
ground, caus ing furth er PCE conta mination). 
9 See N ext Millennium Rea lty, LLC v. Adche m Corp., 201 7 WL 43 50729, 
at * LO (201 7) (e xplaining that Next Millennium vo luntarily conducted a 
c leanup o f the s ite upo n purchase in 1987-98 a nd sought cost recovery and 
contribution unde r CERC LA Sectio ns I 07, I 13(f)(3)( B), and (g)(2)). 
10 See Brief fo r Defe nda nts-Appe llees at 5, ex t Mille nn ium Rea lty, LLC v. 
A dche m Corp. , 2 01 6 WL 5699964 (2d C ir. 20 16) (No. 16- 1260-cv) (a rguing 
that strict liability is justifi ed due to N SR's bene fit fro m the activiti es that 
ca used the co nta mination) . 
11 2 15 F.3d 32 1 (2d C ir. 2000). 
12 See Next Millennium, 690 F. A pp ' x at 7 14 (deny ing the pla inti ff's request 
to overrul e Commander Oil due to case law that says the court is bound by pri or 
dec is ions unless overrul ed by an e n ba ne pa ne l o r by the Supre me Court). 
13 See generally Commander Oil Corp. , 2 15 F. 3d at 32 1 (dive rging fro m the 
sta te-specific co mmon la w definition o f "owner" under CERC LA). 
14 See id. a t 330-3 1 (expla ining that the fi ve factors are non-exclusive). 
15 See ex t Millennium Rea lty, LLC v. Adche m Corp., o. CV 
03-5985(A R_L), 20 14 WL 5425488, a t * 11 (E. D. .Y . Oct. 22, 2014), ajf'd sub 
nom. ex t Mille nnium Realty, LLC v. Adc he m Corp. , 690 F. A pp' x 7 10, 7 15 
(2d C ir. 201 7) (concluding that the landowne r had the bene fits and respons ibili-
ti es o f o wnership). 
16 See id. ( re fu s ing to ho ld the di sso lved co rpo ratio n respons ible despite the 
tenant acting a a n owner by subleas ing to an ope rato r who caused the conta mi-
nati on of the s ite) . 
17 See generally Commander Oil Corp., 2 15 F.3d at 327 (emphasizing the 
di stincti o ns be tween "owne r" and " o pe rator" a nd ass ig ning liability based on 
the unique facts o f the case). 
18 See Petiti o n for Writ o f Certio ra ri , supra note I, a t i (di stingui shing the 
facts o f the case from the factors set by Commander Oil). 
19 See Next Mille nnium Rea lty, LLC v. Adche m Corp. , 138 S. Ct. 5 10 (20 17) 
(g iving no expla na tion as to why the S upre me Court de nied certiora ri ). 
20 See generally , Next Millennium Rea lty, LLC v . A dchem Corp. , No. C V 
03-59 85(GR-8), 2016 WL 11 7895 7 (E.D .. Y. Mar. 2 3, 2016). 
21 See Petitio n for Writ o f Certiorari , supra note I, a t i, (asking the Supreme 
Court to change the standards fo r determining owner lia bility under CERC LA). 
22 See infra Part II (di scuss ing Congress io na l in tent a nd li ability under 
CERC LA). 
23 See inf ra Part ll (outlining C ERC LA, liability, contributio n, and the C ircuit 
split in owner liability under CERC LA). 
24 See infra Pa rt Ill (demonstrating that courts that follow state common law 
definition of "ownership" place the financial burden o f cleanup on those re spon-
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140 See Colorado v. ASARCO, Inc., 608 F. Supp. 1484, 1489 (D. Colo. 1985) 
(supporting the development of the federa l common law to ach ieve uniformity 
of the law). 
141 See United States v. Md. Bank & Tr. Co., 632 F. Supp. 573, 577 (0. Md. 
1986) (explaining that a party may be he ld li able as " the owner and operator," 
and also may be held li ab le as e ither the "owner" or the "opera tor"). 
142 See, e.g., New York v. Shore Rea lty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1050 (2d C ir. 
1985) (holding the defendant li ab le as both owner and operator). 
143 See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)( I )-(2) (stating "the owner and operator of a vesse l 
or a faci lity" and "any person who ... owned or operated"); see, e.g., Shore 
Realty Corp., 759 F.2d at I 052 (suggesting that an "owner" may or may not 
a lso be the "operator" of a property). 
144 See Maryland Bank, 632 F. Supp. at 578 (fi nding that operator and owner 
can be he ld liable separate ly but acknowledging from the grammar of statute 
that a party can be held liable as both). 
145 See id. (ex plaining that due to Congress ' s haste in writing the statute, courts 
need not interpret the statute as exact). 
146 See generally Colorado v. ASARCO, Inc., 608 F. Supp. 1484, 1486 (0. 
Co lo. 1985) (noting that federa l courts may use their di scretion to interpret the 
statute within the intentions of the Congress). 
147 See id. (conc luding that Congress empowered federal courts to decide 
whether to permit contribution among responsible parties). 
148 See general(y Petition fo r Writ of Certiorari , supra note I (comparing the 
Second Circuit ownership test to the N inth Circuit approach to CE RCLA own-
ership liability and arguing that the Second Circuit ownership test is incorrect). 
149 See El Paso Nat. Gas Co. v. Un ited States, No. CV- 14-08165-PCT-OGC, 
20 17 WL 2405266, at *4 (0. Ari z. June 2, 20 17) (rely ing on Ca li fo rn ia case 
law to determine that a fee tit le owner has control over how a ho lde r of a permit 
uses the property). 
15° Compare id. at *7 (c iting Castl erock Estates, Inc. v. Estate of Markham, 
87 1 F. Supp. 360, 364 (N. D. Ca l. 1994)) (questioning " indicia of ownership," 
which may no longer be good law in Ca li fo rnia, in determining owner liabili ty 
under CERCLA, and noting that even San Pedro discussed the unique facts 
of the case to support its finding), with Commander Oil Corp. v. Bario Equ ip. 
Corp ., 2 15 F.3d 32 1, 330-33 1 (2d Cir. 2000) (applying the unique facts of the 
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case to a factor test to de termine liability, and expanding the common law site 
control test). 
151 See C ity of Los Ange les v. San Pedro Boat Works , 635 F.3d 440, 449 (9th 
C ir. 20 I I) (rejecting both the Commander Oil test and the "s ite control" test) . 
152 See, e.g., Long Beach Unifi ed Sch. Dist. v. Doroth y B. Godwin Cal. Living 
Tr., 32 F.3d 1364, 1368 (9th Cir. 1994) (ana lyzing mostly Ca li forn ia common 
law); San Pedro Boat Works, 635 F.3d at 448 (looking to common law to 
di stinguish between ownership interests and possessory interests); El Paso Na t. 
Gas Co., 20 17 WL 2405266, at *5 (following the example of common law to 
look to the law govern ing the property rather than to the unique facts of the 
case). 
153 Compare El Paso Nat. Gas Co., 2017 WL 2405266, at *5 (questioning 
whether fee title is suffic ient to define ownership fo r liability under CERC LA) 
with Commander Oil, 2 15 F.3d at 330 (deciding that site control a lone is insuf-
fici ent for defi ning ownership under CERCLA). 
154 See, e.g., San Pedro Boal Works, 635 F.3d at 449 (looking to state common 
law to determine that mere ly ho lding possessory interests does not constitute an 
owner under CERCLA); Long Beach Unified Sch. Dist., 32 F.3d at 1368 (look-
ing to state common law to determine that holding an easement does not itse lf 
constitute "ownership" ho lding). 
155 See Long Beach Unified Sch. Dis1., 32 F.3d at 1368 (noting that Congress 
purposefull y wrote a c ircular definition fo r "owner" in CERCLA). 
156 See id. at 1370 (affirming the di strict court's decision to grant the defen-
dant 's motion to di smiss, because merely hav ing an easement does not consti-
tute "ownership"). 
157 See id. 
158 Id. at 1368 (recogniz ing the di stinctions between property interest and 
ri ghts of exc lusion, and between owning an easement and owning the property 
itse lf). 
159 See generally San Pedro Boat Works , 635 F.3d at 443 (ho lding that because 
Pacific Ameri can was a ho lder of mere possessory interests, BCI Coca-Cola 
was not an owner and therefore not he ld li ab le as an owner). 
160 See id. (ho lding that Pac ific American was not li ab le as an owner for contri-
bution to costs of c leanup). 
161 See Petition for Writ of Certiorari , supra note I, at 8 (ca ll ing upon the 
S upreme Court to overturn the Second Ci rcuit 's ownership test). 
162 See id. at 9 (explaining that under New York common law, courts gener-
ally ho ld tenants and not landlords responsible for injury caused by the leased 
property) . 
163 See El Paso Nat. Gas Co. v. United States, No. CV- 14-08 165- PCT-DGC, 
20 17 WL 3492993, at *5 (D. Ariz. Aug. 15, 20 17) (emphas iz ing the relevance 
of federa l statutory and common law in addition to the ordinary meaning of 
property ownership in deciding to ho ld the party li ab le that was responsible for 
the contam ination). 
164 See id. at *3. (noting that no authority limits ownership to one entity). 
165 See id. at *5. (expla ining that a lthough the Navajo Nation had a significant 
property interest in the land, the defendan ts were held li ab le as owners w hen 
considering the remedial purpose of the statute and the defendants ' supervisory 
and plenary powers in the land). 
166 See, e.g., City of Los Ange les v. San Pedro Boat Works, 635 F.3d 440, 44 7 
(9th Cir. 20 I I) (re lievi ng a party who did not know or have reason to know of 
the contamination); Long Beach Unified Sch . Di st. v. Doroth y B. Godwin Cal. 
Living Tr., 32 F.3d 1364, 1366 (9th C ir. 1994) (avo iding plac ing the burden on 
those who mere ly have an easement fo r the faci lity and are no t responsible for 
the po llution); El Paso Nat. Gas Co., 2017 WL 2405266, at* I, *5 (D. Ariz. 
June 2, 20 17). 
167 See Petition fo r Writ of Certiorari, supra note I, at I I (noting that Congress 
intended to encourage parties to share the costs of cleanup). 
l68 6 13 F. 3d 9 10 (9th C ir. 20 10). 
169 See id. at 9 16 (ca lculating the statute of limitations from the time a party 
incurs cleanup costs). 
170 See id. at 9 15 (noting that lawsuits would be delayed if ownership was 
calculated at the time a lawsuit was fi led). 
171 See Next Millennium Realty, LLC v. Adchem Corp ., No. CV 
03-5985(GRB), 20 16 WL 11 78957 (E.D.N.Y . Mar. 23, 20 16), aff'd sub 
nom. Next Mi llennium Realty, LLC v. Adchem Corp ., 690 F. App'x 710 (2d 
Cir. 20 17), cerl. denied, 138 S. Ct. 5 10(20 17) (ho lding the subsequent buyer 
liable as the owner and not a llowing the subsequent buyer to rece ive contribu-
tion from the other PRPs). 
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172 See Petition for Writ of Certiorari , supra note I, at I 0 (noting that Congress 
intended that PRPs share the costs of cleanup and therefore the subsequent 
buyer could have sought contribution from the PRPs). 
173 Next Millennium, 690 F. App 'x a t 7 14 (explaining the pla intifr s argument 
that tena nts who sublease a site without notice or consent to the owner and 
benefit from the sublease should be held liable for the cleanup of contaminants 
that occur as a result o f the sublease). 
174 See id. (emphas izing that the subsequent purchaser was understandably 
confident that the other PRPs wou ld be held liable). 
175 See Petition for Writ of Certiorari , supra note I, at 7 (demonstrating the 
roo m for manipulation in Second C ircuit litigation o f CERC LA liability, which 
makes the Commander Oil factor test invalid and inconsistent with Congress's 
intent) . 
176 See OHM Remediation Servs. v . Evans Cooperage Co., 11 6 F.3d I 574, 
I 578 (5th C ir. I 997) (speci fy ing that a ll sued parties are "potentiall y li able"). 
177 See B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Murtha, 958 F .2d I 192, I I 98 (2d Cir. I 992) 
(express ing that the Supreme Court has held tJrnt courts should fo llow the plain 
language o f the statute) ; 3550 Stevens Creek Assocs. v. Barclays Bank, 9 15 
F.2d 1355, 1363 (9th C ir. 1990) (enforcing broad interpretations that the statute 
a lso permits on its face) . 
178 See Petition for Writ o f Certiorari , supra note I , at 8 (explaining that under 
New York common Jaw, li ability in tort concerning property generally depends 
on occ upation and control , and New York 's courts followed this principle to 
interpret sta te environmental statutes) . But see Dept. o f Toxic Substances 
Contro l v. Hearthside Res idential Corp ., 61 3 F.3d 910, 9 14 (9 th Cir. 20 I 0) 
(explaining that the statute of limita tions is ca lculated from the time clea nup 
costs are incurred). 
179 See, e.g., New York v. Shore Rea lty Corp., 759 F.2d I 032, 1050 (2d C ir. 
198 5) ( finding the defendant sufficie ntly liable as both owner and operator of 
the facility). 
180 See United States v. Md . Bank & Tr. Co., 632 F. Supp. 573, 577 (D. Md. 
1986) (expla ining that a party may be held li able as " the owner and operator," 
the "owner," or the "operator"). 
18 1 See id. at 578 (ass igning operator and o wner li ability separately and 
expla ining the imperfect nature of the statute's grammar). 
182 See Petition fo r Writ o f Certiorari , supra note I, a t i (arguing that tenants 
who sublea e a site w ithout notice or consent to the owner and benefit fro m the 
sublease should be he ld li ab le fo r the cleanup of conta minants that occur as a 
result of tJ1 e sublease). 
183 See C ity o f Los Angeles v. San Pedro Boat Works, 635 F.3d 440, 444-45 
(9th C ir. 20 I I) (recognizi ng that the PRP did not have the power to convey the 
revoca ble permit without the landowner's approva l and thus d id not pass the 
" bundle of sti cks" ru le). 
184 See Petition fo r Writ of Certiorari , supra note I , a t 8- 9 (relying on sta te 
common law fo r land and buildings, and specify ing that in ew York common 
law, thi s rule rema ins the presumpti on unless express ly modified by contract or 
statute) . 
185 See id. (conc luding that because ew York common law genera lly depends 
on occupati on and control , the sublessor of the facility, not the landlord, should 
be he ld re ponsible) . 
186 See 3550 Stevens Creek Assocs. v. Barcl ays Bank, 9 15 F.2d 1355, 1365 
(9th C ir. 1990) (finding that CERC LA 's strict li ability cannot be extended to 
past and present owners o f buildings containing asbestos) . 
l87 Compare ext Millennium Real ty, LLC v. Adchem Corp., No. CV 
03-5985(GRB), 20 16 WL I 178957 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 23, 2016), ajj"d sub 
nom. Next Millennium Realty, LLC v. Adchem Corp., 690 F. App 'x 7 10 (2d 
C ir. 20 I 7), cert. denied, ext Millennium Rea lty, LLC v. Adchem Corp., 138 
S. C t. 510(2017) (describing that the sublessor may have exercised site control 
over the property, but still find ing that the sublessor was not liable for contribu-
tion because it was di ssolved) with 3550 Stevens Creek Assocs., 9 15 F.2d at 
1365 (notin g that the PRP did not hold the " bund le o f ri ghts" that are required 
under Ca lifornia common law to constitute ownership, and therefore findin g the 
PRP not li able as an owner under CERCLA). 
188 See 3550 Stevens Creek Assocs., 915 F.2d at 1365 (Pregerson, J., di ssent-
ing) (noting that Section I 07(a)(2) applies to a narrow pri vate class o f landown-
ers under CERC LA). 
189 See id. (recogniz ing that a narrow interpretation of CERC LA liability 
would fru strate the purpose of the s tatute, a nd instead applying a narrow 
interpreta tio n of owner li ability due to Jack o f re levant commo~ Jaw regarding 
asbestos di sposal). 
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190 See Commander Oil Corp. v. Bario Equip. Corp. , 2 15 F.3d 32 I, 327 (2d 
C ir. 2000) (recognizing the diffi culty in limiting CERCLA liability, yet lim iting 
liability to those who do not pass a fi ve-factor test). 
19 1 See id. at 327- 28 (di stinguishing between Bestfoods and Commander 
Oil). See generally United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 5 1, 52 ( I 998) (defi n-
ing "operator" as the entity that manages, directs, or conducts contaminating 
actions). 
192 See City of Los Angeles v. San Pedro Boat Works, 635 F.3d 440, 448 (9th 
C ir. 20 I I) (specifying that an easement alone does not constitute ownership and 
that other elements are required to be liable under C ERCLA). 
193 See id. at 445 (looking to common Jaw in the state where the land at issue is 
located) . 
194 See id. at 447 (explaining that BC! Coca-Cola, as successor-in-interest to 
Pacific A meri can, would constitute an "owner" if Pacific A merican constitutes 
an "owner"). 
195 See id. at 448-49 (considering case law where courts looked at site contro l 
to determine ownership and express ly rejecting the Commander Oil factor test 
as nebulous and flexible) . 
196 See id. at 449 (rejecting the Second Ci rcuit' s factor test as susceptib le to 
manipulation). 
197 See Petition fo r Writ of Certiorari , supra note I, at 9 (ex plaining that New 
York common Jaw presumes tenants and not landlords are held responsible fo r 
inju ry caused by leased property). 
198 See id. (stating that the inth C ircuit fo llows Congress's intent to hold 
li able as owners those who retained the power of the property) . 
199 See id. at 8-9 (explaining that New York common Jaw has treated les-
sees as owners when they have control over the site at the time of injury or 
contamination) . 
200 See generally id. (summarizing that the ew York common law test for 
ownership is whether the party had occupation and site control). 
201 See B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Murtha, 958 F.2d I 192, 11 98 (2d Cir. I 992); 
3550 Stevens Creek Assoc iates v. Barclays Bank, 9 I 5 F.2d I 355, I 363 (9th Cir. 
I 990) (en fo rcing broad interpretations that are also pern1ined on the face of the 
statu te). 
202 See Petition fo r Wri t of Certiorari , supra note I, at 6-7 (arguing that the 
indicia of ownership test is un predictable). 
203 See 3550 Stevens Creek Associates, 9 I 5 F.2d at I 363 (interpreting CE R-
C LA broadly because it is a re medial statute). 
204 See El Paso at. Gas Co. v. United States, o. CV- 14-08165- PCT-DGC, 
20 I 7 WL 3492993, at *5 (D. Ar iz. Aug. 15, 201 7) (specify ing that the defen-
dants granted the avajo Na tion exc lusive use and occupancy of the propen y, 
and yet the de fendants remained liable as owners) . 
205 See id. (finding that the defendants ' power over the land contributed to their 
li ab ility as owners under CERCLA). 
206 See City o f Los Angeles v. San Pedro Boat Works, 635 FJd 440, 449 (9th 
Cir. 201 I) (defini ng the term "owner" by common Jaw rather than by a factor 
test and crit icizing the Commander Oil five- facto r test as easy to manipulate in 
litigation due to fl exi ble fac tors). 
207 Compare El Paso Na1. Gas Co., 20 I 7 WL 2405266, at *7 (citing Cas-
tlerock Estates, Inc. v. Estate of Markham, 87 1 F. Supp. 360, 364 (N. D. Cal. 
I 994)) (questi oning the ro le of"indicia of ownership," which may no longer 
be good Jaw in California, in determining owner li ability under CERC LA, and 
noting that even San Pedro discussed the unique facts of the case to suppon 
its fi nding), wilh Commander Oil Corp. v. Bario Equip. Corp., 2 I 5 F .3d 32 I, 
330-33 I (2d C ir. 2000) (applying the unique facts of the case to a factor test to 
determine li abi lity, and expanding the common law site contro l test). 
208 See El Paso Nat. Gas Co., 20 I 7 WL 2405266, at *7 (focusing on the rel-
evant common law). 
209 See Petition for Writ of Certiorari , supra note I, at 7 (noting that the five 
factors are easy to manipu late due to their nebulous nature). 
2 10 See id. (noting that New York' s courts fo llowed the common Jaw to inter-
pret state environmental statutes). 
211 See, e.g., El Paso Na!. Gas Co., 20 I 7 WL 3492993, at *5 (holding defen -
dants li able because they had significant power and contro l over the property). 
2 12 See Petition for Writ of Certiorari , supra note I, at 7 (explaining that New 
York common Jaw generall y holds tenants and not landlords responsible for 
injury caused by the leased property). 
213 See OHM Remediation Servs . v. Evans Cooperage Co., I 16 F.3d I 574, 
1578 (5 th Cir. I 997) (di stributing liability among those who were responsi ble 
fo r the contamination, so that they bore the financial burden of the costs of 
cleanup of the contamination). 
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214 See, e.g., 3550 Stevens Creek Assocs . v. Barclays Bank, 9 15 F.2d 1355, 
1363 (9th Cir. 1990) (recognizing that despite broad interpretation o f CERC LA 
liability, constructi on o f a statute cannot ex tend to what is not permitted on the 
face o f the statute or to what is not supported by leg is lati ve hi story). 
215 See Petition fo r Writ of Certiorari , supra note I, at 10 (arguing that Con-
gress should create a c lear path fo r li abi lity of lessees where a tenant bas exc lu-
s ive contro l ofa fac ility, subleases without the landlord 's consent or notice, and 
pro fits substanti a ll y from subleas ing the fac ility). 
216 See id. at 9- 10 (referencing judici a l precedent that promotes recovery from 
responsible parties). 
217 See id. at I 0 (emphas izing that a sub lessor who has exclusive contro l over a 
fac ili ty should be an indicator of ownershi p). 
218 See id. (explaining that ext Mi llennium agreed to conduct the site reme-
d iati on, wi th the confidence that other liab le parti es wo uld con tribute to the 
fi nancial burden). 
219 See id. (noting that Congress ional intent is typica ll y fo llowed by courts, 
with the Second Circuit as the exception). 
220 See id. (noting that the Second Circuit has not fo llowed congressional 
intent). See generally City o f Los Angeles v. San Pedro Boat Works, 635 F.3d 
440, 449 (9th Cir. 20 I I) (rejecting the Commander Oil ownership test because 
it does not clearly outline what an investor in a fac ility can expect) . 
221 See Fischer, supra note 27, at 1987 (expla ining that government response 
rather than private cleanup de lays cleanup). 
222 See id. at 1984 (explaining that government response rathe r than priva te 
cleanup delays cleanup). 
223 See ext Millennium Realty, LLC v. Adchem Corp., 138 S. Ct. 510, 199 
(20 I 7) (prov iding no explanation as to why certiorari was denied). 
224 See generally Petit ion for Writ of Certiora ri , supra note I (arguing that the 
five-factor Commander Oil test does not a llow an in vestor in land to predict the 
outcome of a contribution suit). 
225 See, e.g., id. (showing that Commander Oil is suscepti ble to manipulation 
in litigati on because the fac tors are unc lear, giving courts too much di scretion 
which is like ly to result in a narrower interpretati on o f CE RCLA liability) . 
226 See, e.g., id. at i (emphas iz ing that the subsequent purchaser was under-
standably confident that the other PRPs would be he ld liable under CERCLA 
Section I I 3(f)). 
227 See Fischer, supra note 27, at 1987 (noti ng the importance of private 
c leanup, and that the CERCLA amendments confirm the importance of the 
remed ial goa ls of the statute) . 
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228 See C ity of Los An geles v. San Pedro Boat Works, 635 F.3d 440, 448-49 
(9th Cir. 2011 ) (considering case law where cou1ts looked at s ite contro l to 
de termine ownership and express ly rejecting the Commander Oil factor test as 
nebulous and fl ex ible). 
229 See generally id. (explaining that parti es o f a CE RCLA suit should be abl e 
to expect a certain outcome, which would incenti vize quick settl ements). 
230 See 42 U. S.C. § 9601 (20)(a) (20 12) (defining "owner or operator" as a 
party that owns or operates); Petition fo r Writ o f Certiorari , supra note I, at 8 
(ca lling upon the Supreme Court to overturn the Second Circuit 's ownership 
test). 
23 1 See Next Millennium Rea lty, LLC v. Adchem Corp ., No. CV 
03-5985(G RB), 20 16 WL 11 78957 (E. D. .Y. Mar. 23, 20 16), aff'd sub 
nom. Next Millennium Realty, LLC v. Adchem Corp., 690 F. App ' x 7 10 (2d 
C ir. 20 17), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 5 10 (20 17) (denying the pla inti ff's req uest 
to overrule Commander Oil due to case law that says the court is bound by prio r 
decis ions un less overruled by an en bane panel or by the Supreme Court). 
232 Cf Ho ll y, supra note 34 at I 59-6 1 (emphas iz ing the need fo r uni fo rmity in 
the application ofCERC LA). 
233 Cf id. (noting the di versity among state case law under CERC LA). 
234 See generally Commander Oil Corp. v. Bari o Equip. Corp ., 21 5 F.3d 
32 1 (separating "owner" and "operator," the refore limiting liability to e ither 
"owner" or "operator" li abili ty rather than both). 
235 The Supreme Court must wa it to grant certiora ri in a case a lternat ive to 
Next Millennium, where the tenant corporation has not been di ssolved. Cf Peti -
ti on fo r Writ of Certiorari , supra note I, al 8 (arguing that the Supreme Court 
sho uld overrule Commander Oil). 
236 See B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Murtha, 958 F.2d I I 92, I I 98 (2d Cir. I 992) 
(prioriti z ing congressional intent when maki ng pivota l decis ions regard ing 
CERCLA interpretation). 
237 See Petition fo r Writ of Certiorari, supra note I, at i (asking the Supreme 
Court to change the standards for determi ning owner li abi li ty under CERCLA). 
238 See, e.g., El Paso at. Gas Co. v. United States, o. CV-14-08 165-PCT-
DGC, 201 7 WL 3492993, at * I (D. Ari z. Aug. 15, 201 7) (re ly ing on CER-
C LA 's remedia l purpose to support that the defendants were liable as owners 
under CERCLA). 
239 See, e.g., id. at * I (noting that the inth Circuit' s approach to owner li abil -
ity under CERC LA a llows parties of a case to predict the outcome). 
240 See Fischer, supra note 27, at 2003 (noting that CERCLA attempts to 
re move hazards of con tamination q ui ck ly and efficient ly). 
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